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It is well known that James Willard Hurst's The Growth of American
Law "represented something new" and that it "dissolved constraints" and
helped start Hurst's successful effort to expose "the hitherto invisible ways
in which the apparently most commonplace incidents of a legal order illu-
minate social values."' In the early 1950s, reviewers recognized the book
as a pioneering effort. Time has enhanced Hurst's achievement. He is the
legal historian who broke out of the limits of traditional legal history. His
work made him "the leading exponent and practitioner of an external his-
toriography."2 Although the legal process approach began to supersede
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mark Willard Hurst's 80th birthday and the 40th anniversary of The Growth of American
Law. An expanded version will appear in Review in American History.
1. Robert Gordon, "Introduction: J. Willard Hurst and the Common Law Tradition
in American Legal Historiography," 10 Law & Soc'y Rev. 9, 45, 54 (1975). Gordon's study
remains an exemplary overview of American legal historiography, as well as a particularly
insightful commentary on Hurst's contributions. For a companion piece, illustrating the
importance of Hurst's work by criticizing and expanding on it, see Harry N. Scheiber, "Fed-
eralism and the American Economic Order, 1789-1910," 10 Law & Soc'y Rev. 57 (1975). A
good Hurst bibliography through 1975 is available (Ronald Eskin & Robert Hayden, "A
Bibliography of Work by and about J. Willard Hurst," id. at 326); another accompanies a
festschrift in his honor published in 1980 Wisconsin Law Review 1093.
2. Gordon, Law & Soc'y Rev. at 12. These days, the very idea of an "outsider's perspec-
tive" is controversial; see, e.g., Marc Galanter, "Review Essay: Outside, Inside: Jewish Jus-
tices in the Homeless Society," 14 Law & Soc. Inquiry 507 (1989) (reviewing Robert A. Burt,
Two Jewish Justices: Outcasts in the Promised Land (1988)). Gordon is surely accurate, how-
ever, when he stresses how innovative Hurst actually was in adopting an outsider's perspec-
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legal realism in American law schools in the wake of World War II, Hurst's
book actually was the first sustained example of legal realist history.
Hurst's approach moves far beyond the traditional box of autono-
mous legal doctrine; he concentrates instead on economic and social fac-
tors that continuously interfere with any and all efforts through law "to
order men's affairs according to rational weighing of values and the means
of achieving them" (at 25). His tale is a generally grim account of omis-
sions and actions that undercut whatever creativity and commonwealth
ideals remained from the 18th century. Hurst notes, moreover, that since
about 1870 there has been precious little creativity, and virtually no suc-
cess in legal planning or response. Thus, "It]he law has no very proud
story to tell of itself" (at 17). Yet there is great reason for pride in the
story of the man and the book. Unfortunately, both are in danger of be-
coming forgotten classics. Neither is flashy or easy to categorize. More-
over, both Hurst and his pioneering book now are victimized by
pigeonholing. Many who do not read the work nevertheless discuss it as
celebratory consensus history, premised on uncritical functionalism. Actu-
ally, Hurst manages to combine extraordinary attention to detail with di-
rect critical treatment of some of the biggest questions society confronts.
So it is particularly important to attend carefully to a rarity: a complex
path-breaking book produced by an extraordinary scholar.
In 1950, The Growth of American Law made it clear that to be a legal
historian would mean thereafter that "You're either a Hurstian or a reviser
of Hurst."3 Forty years later, it has become necessary to puncture some
myths. In particular, the dragons to be coaxed from their caves today are
the prevalent assumptions: (1) that Hurst assumes consensus in American
legal history and (2) that he celebrates it. We will see instead that Hurst
tells a tale of dissensus. He tracks missed opportunities. The trend he
notes is historical decline. Yet he clearly seeks to write for the ages, and he
remains a committed reformer rather than a cynical observer.
Pictures and paradoxes illuminate the statistical detail and painstak-
ingly gathered evidence central to The Growth of American Law. Hurst's
phenomenal attention to, and appreciation for, institutional details is
noteworthy. His pervasive faith in the possibility for democracy and ac-
tive in contrast to previous legal historians. See generally Morton Horwitz, "The
Conservative Tradition in the Writing of American Legal History," 17 Am. 1. Legal HisL 281
(1973). Nevertheless, Hurst has been subject to criticism for not adequately attending to the
perspective of those outside his primary concern with the routine business, institutions, and
ordinary people of society. Thus, rebels and outlaws, ethnic and racial minorities are rarely
subjects for Hurst's scholarly attention. For critical commentary, see, e.g., Eugene Geno-
vese, "Law and the Economy in Capitalist America: Questions for Mr. Hurst on the Occa-
sion of His Curti Lectures," 1985 A.B.F. Res. J. 113; Sidney L Harring & Barry R. Strutt,
"Lumber, Law, and Social Change: The Legal History of Willard Hurst," id at 123; and
sources cited infra note 15.
3. Lawrence Friedman, quoted in David Margolick, "At the Bar," N.Y. Times, 23 Mar.
1990, at B5, col. 1.
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countability-a faith he has maintained despite the drift of the data he so
studiously marshalled-seems heroic and suddenly quite au courant in the
wake of the European revolution of 1989. It is worth exploring how this
doubting optimist achieved the extraordinary feat of quietly, studiously
establishing a new paradigm.
I. SOME BIOGRAPHICAL NOTES
Scores of scholars have learned that no one reads a draft and provides
meticulous comments the way that Willard Hurst does. He types pages of
comments in long, single-spaced letters that gently push for more research
beyond the usual subjects and that critique, even more gently, in his quiet
way. Yet few of us know much about his own life. Despite his drive to
teach large truths about law and social and economic forces through metic-
ulous mastery of details, he has, with customary humility, neglected to let
us know much about himself.
Hurst was born just across the Wisconsin border in Rockford, Illinois.
He attended Williams College, where he studied history and economics,
and graduated from Harvard Law School in 1935. He then worked for a
year as a research assistant to Felix Frankfurter at Harvard and clerked for
Justice Brandeis in the 1936 Term.
Notes of an interview Samuel Konefsky conducted with Hurst in 1951
reveal much about Brandeis-and Hurst. In that interview, Hurst ac-
knowledged Brandeis's starkly austere habits and the distance Brandeis
maintained from his clerks. Yet Hurst did not attribute these traits to
miserliness or to rigidity. And he praised Brandeis for making it respect-
able to be "a man of ideas" in the eyes of the common man and for purs-
ing "the secret joys of a thinker." 4
After his clerkship, Hurst returned to the hinterlands and Brandeis
urged-to the University of Wisconsin. Hurst considered Wisconsin "just
about an ideal 'laboratory' situation fromthe [sic] standpoint of studying
the legislative process: a state in which there is a long tradition of political
experiment, which seems to go on pretty well even when there is not a La
Follette ascendency [sic]; and some first rate civil service people.., within
a ten minute walk of the campus."5 For Hurst, the function of govern-
ment involved "a positive duty through cooperative aid to set men free
from the tyrannies that otherwise might be imposed by nature and other
4. Samuel Konefsky, Interview Notes, 14 Sept. 1951, Book 1, at 6-11, graciously made
available to me by his son, Fred Konefsky.
5. Hurst to Felix Frankfurter, 3 Jan. 1938, Frankfurter Papers, Manuscript Division,
Library of Congress. Stanley Kutler found this letter and graciously made it available to me.
In it, Hurst considered with characteristic care the costs and benefits in the first of many
attempts made by Yale and Harvard law schools to lure him to join their law faculties.
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human beings."6 A central point throughout his work was that by supply-
ing order in any form, government involved series of choices. In frontier
communities and New Deal agencies alike, fundamental normative deci-
sions established the crucial legal framework within which groups and in-
dividuals made further, relatively fettered choices. The obligation of the
academic was to learn about and become involved in reforming
government.
It is hardly surprising, therefore, that the case study that Hurst and
Lloyd Garrison chose to pursue through the first volume of their pioneer-
ing Law in Society casebook of 1941 involved various ways that law in Wis-
consin intersected with a widow's claim for damages after her husband, a
carnival worker, was crushed beneath a company tractor. The casebook
includes witnesses' accounts that vividly portray the gory scene as Gervase
Hannon literally poured out his guts before his death. But this prototype
for the law and society movement was designed to equip undergraduates as
well as law students with enough sophistication about law to realize that
neither legislative, judicial, nor administrative treatment of Hannon's
case-nor of any other case large or small-is inevitable in itself or com-
manded by law.
There was no claim to neutrality here. Law in Society, and more viv-
idly Hurst's later work, contains elements of a radical reformist, one might
even say utopian, agenda. Facts may always caution and generally suggest
decline rather than improvement over time, making the use of "growth"
in the titles of several of Hurst's books seem problematic at first glance.
Yet, with a combination of Holmesian toughness and Hurstian faith, the
facts matter. Facts set severe limits, yet change must still be attempted.
With Holmes, Hurst has "no belief in panaceas and almost none in sudden
ruin" (Growth at 209, quoting Holmes). At best, growth leads to decline
and death, yet growth still merits attention and care.
In a 1942 article setting forth a "Research Program" for legal history,
Hurst doubted that each generation learns much from its predecessors.
"But," he continued, "civilization is a minority affair. To believe in educa-
tion is to believe that there are opportunities to apply informed, humane
reason to influence the course of events."7 Soon thereafter, Hurst went to
Washington, first served in the general counsel's office of the U.S. Board
of Economic Warfare. He tried to use wartime contracting power to im-
prove working conditions of Bolivian miners, for example. Hurst then
joined the Navy, where he was assigned work on the famous Cramer trea-
6. Donald Richberg, "The Industrial Liberalism of Mr. Justice Brandeis," in Felix
Frankfurter, ed., Mr. Justice Brandeis 138 (1932).
7. 1942 Yis. L Rev. 323, 324.
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son case, which ultimately led to his first published work in legal history, a
detailed study of the origins of the law of treason.8
By 1945, Hurst was arguing that there seemed "no reason except tra-
dition, never itself adequately founded, why legal history should be nar-
rowed to a study of the resolution of social conflicts by litigation."9 In an
essay analyzing books written by nonlawyers about Wisconsin, Michigan,
Montana, and Oklahoma, Hurst noted that perceptions about the relative
role of legal institutions in history by laymen "may be the fresher and the
more unbiased."' 10 He emphasized what he called the colonial relationship
of raw-material-producing states to older regions; the persistent tension
between debtors and creditors in American history; and "the surge of
clashing interests of all kinds."" Even in 1945, he focused on the repeated
"failure," "default," "do-nothing line," and "inertia" of government. To
help explain the failure of legal controls, Hurst explored the distinction
between an unhealthy balance of power on one hand, and social inertia
and simple failure of intelligence on the other. Ranging from attention to
the dogmatic application of the crop-farm ideal in Montana to the rise of
the Ku Klux Klan in the 1920s, which suggested "that the victory of rea-
son and decency is precarious and open to constant challenge," Hurst
hardly proclaimed an upbeat American consensus. He even doubted pro-
gress. Instead, he stressed the wasteful exploitation of natural resources;
"waves of agrarian, lower-middle, and middle-class revolt"; and "public
acquiescence in, and even approval of, shortsighted taking of public
wealth for immediate private gain." 12
Although in this review the nexus of law and the economy emerged as
the most pervasive interrelation, Hurst insisted that more attention ought
to be paid to the effects of other types of power on legal institutions. He
specifically mentioned the impact of family, church, education, and tech-
nology. Even within the law, he claimed, a narrow focus on litigation
seemed "particularly absurd" in an age facing the central problem of
"whether men will be able to use the power of the politically organized
community to secure the basic conditions of a decent life for the individ-
ual, without thereby destroying the very values they are trying to realize."13
Hurst's vigorous doubts were not tailored to fit the exuberant fashion
of post-World War 11 America. Instead, Hurst called for an entirely new
8. Cramer v. United States, 320 U.S. 730 (1943). The articles Willard produced out of
that wartime experience were republished, with additional material, in J. Willard Hurst, The
Law of Treason in the United States (1971).
9. Hurst, "The Uses of Law in Four 'Colonial' States of the American Union," 1945
Wis. L Rev. 577.
10. Id. at 579.
11. Id.
12. Id. at 589.
13. Id. at 577. Hurst was careful to note that these opinions were those of the author,
not of the United States Navy "with which he is at present connected."
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approach. And the rest is history: our basic approach to legal history still
builds on the background theory initially sketched and then realized by
Hurst.
11. THE GROWTH OF AMERICAN LAW:
THE BOOK
The extent to which The Growth of American Law was a departure
from the legal history that had come before it, and not a legal history in
any conventional sense, is difficult to recapture, largely because so many of
us have been influenced by the work of Hurst, whether or not we are
conscious of the impact. In the numerous reviews published soon after the
book appeared, reviewers repeatedly noted that the book, because it was
more physiology than anatomy, said something new and provocative about
American law.14 It is easy to forget how Hurst achieved his breakthrough.
Let us first review the book's careful, innovative structure, and then briefly
consider its message, which is more jeremiad than apologetics.
A. Physiology, not Anatomy
Hurst believes that "[tihe deeper we probe to explain shifts in legal
doctrine, the less we are satisfied with what at first seem the practical an-
swers" (at 12). Therefore, he examines law from as far outside the doctri-
nal box as he can get.15 In doing so, he discovers that the reality
14. For good, sprightly examples of the general enthusiasm for the book, see, e.g., John
Frank, 59 Yale L. 1381 (1950); Frank Horack, Jr., 64 Harv. L Rev. 866 (1951); Robert
Hunt, 35 Iowa L Rev. 730 (1950); and John Roche, 99 U. Pa. L Rev. 263 (1950). Many
others, including Max Radin, Thomas Reed Powell, Philip Kurland, and Phil Neal from the
law schools, and a smattering of political scientists, historians, and sociologists, heaped
praises on what they repeatedly called a pioneering book. A list of these early reviews is
available in 10 Law & Soc'y Rev. 330 (1976).
There were a few exceptions to the general run of rave reviews. The most interesting
were those by Mark DeWolfe Howe, who derided Hurst's "faith in statistics" and criticized
his "cavalier dismissal of the law that was created in the colonies before 1750," N.Y. Herald
Tribune Book Rev., 2 July 1950, at 6; by Erwin Surrency, 24 Temple L Q. 509 (195 1), who gave
the book a mixed review, since he considered it "a great contribution to the field of political
science" but questioned the book's standing as history; and by Ford W. Hall, 28 Tex. L Rev.
992, 994 (1950), who noted Hurst's lack of adequate attention to the influence of treatise
writers on states such as Texas, which were settled in the latter two-thirds of the 19th cen-
tury, but who presciently observed that Hurst "provides a view of a sizeable portion of the
forest."
15. Hurst's ability to break entirely outside the box is central to Robert Gordon's dis-
cussion of his work (10 Law & Soc'y Rev. cited in note 1). Critics of Hurst's work have
challenged his ability to do so and suggest that he is actually at times an apologist for the
status quo who seems to write winners' history. For perceptive criticism that focuses primar-
ily on Hurst's magisterial lumber book, see Harring and Strutt, 1985 A.B.F. Res. J. (cited in
note 2), as well as an article by Eugene Genovese and Hurst's brief response in that Review
Symposium. Other important articles at least partially critical of Hurst's work include Harry
N. Scheiber, "At the Borderland of Law and Economic History: The Contributions of Wil-
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underneath the toughness of institutional structure is that "law has been
more the creature than the creator of events" (at 6). His analysis proceeds
through the impact of physical, technological, and social facts on law in
the United States. 16 He does not deny that ideas matter, however, because
"ideas tie in closely with habits of action, and both change institutions" (at
14). In fact, this pioneer of the impact of economic and social forces on
legal institutions maintains that people are the essential moving causes be-
hind change. The key issue is "what they have in their minds, whether
they are thinking things through more or less consciously, or are acting
out of habit" (at 15). This hardly seems consistent with the commonplace
portrait of Hurst as a pure functionalist, nor does it fit neatly with Talcott
Parsons's criticism of Hurst's later work for "failing to distinguish three
closely related but still . . . importantly different categories, namely the
legal, governmental, and the political."' 7
One of the most significant innovations in the book is the structure,
which departs from the usual analysis of three branches of government.
Hurst studiously seeks to avoid the customary excessive focus on either
appellate judicial opinions or on the impact of great individuals or great
cases. Instead, the book analyzes five legal institutions: the legislature, the
courts, the constitution makers, the bar, and the executive.
Each of these five divisions may be read as a separate essay, but they
have common themes, developed quite schematically within each section
as well as in the book's introduction and conclusion. While there is some
overlap, one finds little repetition. Hurst's clear writing style moves the
reader along at a nice clip no matter where she starts or stops. Sprinkled
lard Hurst," 75 Am. Hist Rev. 744 (1970); Mark Tushnet, "Lumber and the Legal Process,"
1972 Wis. L Rev. 114; and Stephen Diamond, "Legal Realism and Historical Method: J.
Willard Hurst and American Legal History," 77 Mich. L Rev. 784 (1979).
16. Those who attack Hurst as a consensus historian tend to concentrate on his later
Law and Economic Growth. The Legal History of the Lumber Industry in Wisconsin, 1836-1915
(1964). Hurst's critics claim that because of his concern with large issues and dominant
institutions, his lumber book omits crucial elements of conflict of interests, corruption, and
class confrontation. For example, Harring & Strutt, 1985 AB.F. Res. 1., detail a dramatic
series of clashes between John Deitz, a part-time employee and farmer, and the Weyerhauser
lumber "pool" on the Upper Chippewa River in Wisconsin. After years of legal confronta-
tions and sporadic violence, a posse of 40 men shot it out with Deitz and his family on land
the lumber company wanted for a dam. Deitz subsequently got a life sentence for murder,
but he went to jail a hero, sent off by a receiving line of hundreds of supporters and national
press coverage. The story of the Deitz affair-the shoot-out occurred the month Willard
was born-is not included in the lumber book. Willard's response was that such clashes
were marginal, and that his book focuses instead on "conflict typically among contenders
for the stakes in fast exploitation of the forest." Hurst, "Response," 1985 A.B.F. Res. J.
17. Parsons, "Hurst's Law and Social Process in United States History," 23 J. Hist. Ideas
558, 562 (1962). Parsons's review of Hurst's 1960 book nevertheless was overwhelmingly
favorable. Parsons proclaimed that Hurst "may be claimed to stand in the best sociological
traditions" and described Hurst's work as "very illuminating, not simply to those interested
in American history, but to all social scientists who are concerned with the society and
hence must pay attention to the historical background of the problems they study." Id. at
561, 558.
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throughout the book are marvelous nuggets of buried information from a
remarkable array of sources, along with Hurst's clear interpretations. He
repeatedly indicates when there is substantial evidence for the general
points he makes and when there is not, and he is hardly shy about sharing
his judgments. This scholar does not hide behind the screen of academic
neutrality, yet he is more judicious than most scholars and judges who
do.1 8 Moreover, a reader can clearly find Hurst anticipating some of the
most important subsequent contributions in legal scholarship since 1950,
such as Guido Calabresi's work on accidents and social cost (at 12);
Charles Reich's ideas about new property created by judges out of proce-
dural protections (at 91); and Morton Horwitz's thesis about the sub rosa
subsidization of the powerful through judicial decisions and so-called pri-
vate legal ordering (at 72-73, 242-44).
A careful reading of the book discloses flashes of dry humor (e.g.,
"[tihe earlier casebooks were as bare of assisting or amplifying footnotes as
a Dissenters' chapel of sacred ornament," at 265), and Hurst's fascination
with irony helps make the book seem both contemporary and strangely
like a product of the late 18th century. Even if it is not the case that
"[tihere is nothing like a paradox to take the scum off the mind,"' 9 Hurst's
examination of numerous paradoxes in the main currents of American
thought is particularly intriguing. Thus, for example, perhaps the United
States has been an unusually legalistic society because people "were look-
ing for beliefs to which they could hold fast, in a country of change; they
also wanted change which would fulfill the promise of a new continent and
advance their personal fortunes" (at 357). And "the extent to which
Americans put issues into legal terms and tried to use and control the legal
agencies reflected a lesser role for the law" (at 4). Unlike many of us,
however, Hurst does not use paradox to avoid revealing his own position.
To the contrary, he is unusually frank about what he believes the facts to
be and what he makes of them.
It may be useful to consider one of the book's sections in some detail
both to get a sense of where Hurst comes out on the questions he ad-
dresses and to begin to examine the criticism that misses the critical fire
smoldering beneath Hurst's low-key writing style and his kindly disposi-
tion. Section V, "The Bar," probably constitutes Hurst's most radical
scholarly departure. Nobody had ever done such a synthesis before or
considered the many ways in which lawyers are a separate institution wor-
thy of examination. While we have since had much excellent historical
18. Hurst's work anticipates G. Kitson Clark's well-known advice to anyone who seeks
to generalize: "do not guess, try to count, and if you cannot count, admit that you are
guessing." The Making of Victorian England 14 (1962).
19. 1 Holmes-Laski Letters: The Correspondence of Mr. justice Holmes and Harold J. Lask,
1916-1925, at 389 (M. Howe ed. 1953).
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work on the bar,20 Hurst's chapter remains one of the very best analyses of
the role of lawyers in American society.
B. The Bar: "Real Points for Moral Indictment"
Hurst begins the chapter "The Character of the Lawyer in United
States Society" by describing ambivalent popular attitudes toward lawyers.
He briefly reviews the central role of lawyers in typical American success
stories, along with long-standing, widespread anti-lawyer sentiment. Hurst
then makes a revealing move. He condemns popular criticism for missing
"the more real points for moral indictment." These are: first, "the intel-
lectual dishonesty" with which influential lawyers supported private
against public interest; next, the "inertia" of lawyers despite blatant de-
fects in the administration of justice, "though such defects robbed ten
thousand of their due for every one whose money was misappropriated by
a faithless counselor." Finally, Hurst points out that criticism of lawyers
for pursuit of their own economic interest comes "with poor grace from
generations that subscribed to the ambitions they saw in others" (at 252).
One should not be misled. In his customary fashion, Hurst builds his
generalities from scrupulous attention to details. These details ranged
from the structure of law firms to education and admission to the bar and
include the exceedingly conservative role of bar associations representing a
profession whose members on the whole "were among the most unthink-
ingly and stubbornly individualistic members of the loosely organized
American society" (at 285). Moreover, Hurst does a wonderful job of ex-
ploring the tensions within the concept of being a professional in a society
dominated by middle-class attitudes-a nation, that is, "characteristically
distrustful of speculative thought and the grand manner in action; a soci-
ety which was interested in what could be accumulated, counted, and used;
a society that had concern for righteousness, but under a scale of values
formed in a period highly individualistic and competitive in its measure of
a man" (at 305-6). At times, Hurst's indictment sounds like some of the
best of the contemporary critique of possessive individualism. So why
isn't Hurst read, or at least claimed as a progenitor, by vehement critics on
the left or the right in legal education today?
The primary reason, I think, is that Hurst eschewed flamboyant pas-
sion to such an extent that his passionate criticism has been buried. (An-
20. See, e.g., Jerold Auerbach, Unequal Justice: Lawyers and Social Change in Modem
America (1976); Maxwell Bloomfield, American Lawyers in a Changing Society, 1776-1876
(1976); Gerald Gawalt, The Promise of Power: The Emergence of the Legal Profession in Massa-
chusetts, 1760-1820 (1979); Robert Stephens, Law School: Legal Education in America from the
1850s to the 1980s (1983); Robert Ferguson, Law and Letters in American Culture (1984); Rob-
ert Gordon, "The Independence of Lawyers," 68 B.U.L Rev. 1 (1988).
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other reason, of course, is that many of us do not read the books we talk
about.) There is a commonplace, faulty assumption that Hurst is either an
extreme, unsophisticated functionalist or one of those post-World War II
apologists for the status quo now generally lumped under the label "con-
sensus historians.121 It is true that over and over Hurst suggests an Ameri-
can mainstream. But he hardly celebrates it.22 The mainstream is a
torrent of old forms and beliefs ill-adapted to control the selfish and the
powerful. The American character he examines is remarkably short-
sighted. At least since 1870, Americans have been recklessly exploiting
the environment and one another. All the while, as Hurst puts it, Ameri-
cans "have demanded their 'rights' and at the same time concerned them-
selves in fixing the other man's 'duties' (at 3).
Additionally, Hurst's work is overlooked or rejected precisely because
he downplays the drama of individual lives. He believes that such drama
increases our temptation to attribute too much weight to individual contri-
butions. And he can be justifiably criticized for concentrating so much on
the facts and faults of the mainstream that he hardly touches on the
unique problems of discrete and insular minorities. There is little about
African Americans, for example, though he does note their omission from
the American society he describes, and nothing about Native Americans.
But these gaps hardly mean that Hurst embraces the status quo, or that he
does not believe deeply that individuals ought to try to resist the trends he
decries.
I. HURST'S LEGACY
The Growth of American Law is a tale of towering limitations, of no
easy successes, and of great complexity. That Hurst offers no panacea does
not mean that he is satisfied. Nor does his adamant refusal to engage in
conspiracy theorizing connote complacency about the tragic consequences
wrought by the largely unplanned combination of overemphasis on pro-
21. For a recent discussion of the consensus approach, describing it as the counter-
progressive trend that dominated postwar America historical writing, see chap. 11, "A Con-
vergent Culture," in Peter Novick, That Noble Dream: The "Objectivity Question" and the
American Historical Profession 320-60 (1988). Novick notes that the University of Wisconsin
remained "something of a Progressive redoubt" and a "besieged outpost" for historians
"holding out against postwar tendencies." Id. at 345-47. Novick never mentions Hurst,
however, and pays scant attention to legal history.
22. Perhaps only in this sense, Hurst echoed Richard Hofstadter's early statement of
the consensus idea of America as "a democracy in cupidity rather than a democracy of
fraternity" (The American Political Tradition xxxvi-xxxvii (1948)). But this is a far cry from
Hofstadter's later work or from the work of Daniel Boorstin, for example, who led the way
toward a general consensus approach that involved "an attempt to give some positive con-
tent and direction to the essentially negative and critical counterprogressive venture."
Novick, That Nobel Dream 334.
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duction and private power, lack of long-range responsibility, and lack of
interest in facts. The growth of American law, as Hurst describes it, has
not been positive growth. Driven by social and economic forces, uncon-
cerned about conservation, unaware of rampant exploitation, Americans
and therefore American legal institutions grow increasingly out of control.
In fact, there is something almost utopian in Hurst's faith in the dis-
covery of facts as the basis for improvement despite all the sobering facts
and trends he has discovered. He recognizes that the political Progressiv-
ism behind the Wisconsin idea "had the weakness of believing too much
in the power of facts and disinterested expertness" (at 65). Yet Hurst re-
mains closely linked to the Progressives and shares with them a belief in
the affirmative obligation of government to act for the general welfare.
Nevertheless, he concludes Growth of American Law with a pessimistic as-
sessment. He notes both "diminished political sensitivity" and "growing
impersonality in people's dealings with one another" after 1870. Both
worked to give undisciplined freedom to particular interests at the expense
of the individual and community life" (at 440).
The Conclusion, entitled "To . . . Promote the General Welfare,"
concentrates on the breakdown of the sense of community. Hurst thereby
anticipates much of the current debate about republicanism and interest
group pluralism. He clearly sides with those who aspire to civic virtue and
republicanism. Like them, he has not solved the problem of modern inter-
dependence; unlike them, at least Hurst's vision comes to grips somewhat
with the sobering lessons of history. While he states that "[g]roup interest
was the most dynamic force that played on our law," Hurst somewhat sur-
prisingly invokes John C. Calhoun and the danger Calhoun accurately
noted of different interests combining to produce "a spurious expression
of majority policy" (at 439-40). Where once there was a sense of belong-
ing, and of connection to a community, Hurst sees preoccupation with
private business; lack of interest in the efficiency of public institutions; and
reduced involvement in, and even appreciation for, politics. Unlike con-
stitutional law scholars who have led the revival of republicanism during
the 1980s, however, Hurst does not turn to the courts as a likely source for
promoting the general welfare. If he has any hope at all in contemporary
legal institutions, it is in the possibility of some movement on behalf of the
general welfare made by the executive branch of federal and state govern-
ments. In this respect at least, painful experience reminds us of how many
years ago this book was written.
More fundamentally, Hurst believes in education as crucial and in
gathering facts as the essence of power. As Keats once said, however, "A
fact isn't true until you love it." 23 But Hurst is a populist as well as a
23. Shelby Foote, quoting Keats's letter in Mark Muro, "Shelby Foote Makes His Pres-
ence Felt in PBS Epic," Boston Globe, Living sec., 26 Sept. 1990, at 47.
178 LAW AND SOCIAL INQUIRY
progressive. Despite all, Hurst remains a believer somehow in the basic
good of humankind. He decries romanticism and demands that the histo-
rian, even the generally rugged Holmes, not forget to "respect[] the stub-
born resistance of the raw materials. '24 In responding to some of his
critics, Hurst declares himself the kind of legal realist who is concerned
with the deficiency of political processes and the fragmentation of policy-
making into merely responding to organized groups. He views his Wiscon-
sin forest history as the story of "failure to fulfill commonwealth criteria of
rational public policy through adequate accounting for social income and
cost, to the detriment of the long-term vitality of the whole society."
'25
Behind all the ledger-sheet rhetoric, however, there lurks an engaged, even
a quietly enraged, moralist.
Hurst's own values may be evident in his quotation of words used by
Felix Frankfurter in praise of Florence Kelley. Frankfurter wrote:
There are two kinds of reformers whose chief concern has been that
earning a living shall not contradict living a life. One type is apt to
see evil men behind evils and seeks to rout evil by moral fervor. Flor-
ence Kelley belonged to the other, the cooler and more calculating
type. Not that she was without passion. But passion was the driving
force of her mind, not its substitute. She early realized that damning
facts are more powerful in the long run than flaming rhetoric, and
that understanding is a more dependable, because more permanent
ally than the indignation of the moment.
26
And Hurst praised Brandeis because Brandeis "took the oratory out of
liberalism ... [and] put fact in." 27 In a sense, Justice and law clerk some-
how absorbed so much flinty Yankee reserve while at Harvard that they
each made it a virtue.
Hurst also noted, however, that Brandeis believed that the Supreme
Court should be "a sort of Holy Synod, untouchable" and stressed the
symbolic aspect of the institution. Hurst's enthusiasm for the power of
facts has battered down the symbolic redoubt of the Court, and he has
gone beyond the Brandeisian-Wisconsin faith in detached facts and ex-
perts. Hurst instead makes an ironic Niebuhrian leap and embraces en-
gaged fact-facting in democratic politics without the manipulation of
symbols as the last, best hope. In many ways, Hurst is the last, best legal
24. Hurst, Justice Holmes on Legal History 61 (1964). Hurst criticizes the normally tough-
minded Holmes for romanticizing the social sciences, and for failing to perceive the effort of
history to "grasp the whole event" in contrast to the abstraction of the social scientist's
attempt to limit and control variables.
25. J. Willard Hurst, Author's Note, Law and Economic Growth xviii; 2d ed. (1984).
26. Frankfurter, quoted in Hurst, Law and the Conditions of Freedom in the Nineteenth-
Century United States 106-7 (1956).
27. Konefsky Interview at 9 (cited in note 4).
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realist. He has been the most consistent over time, the legal realist most
able to bridge the gap between finding the facts and trying to do some-
thing in the real world once the facts are known. In Hurst's career there
may be no prescription for how to achieve utopia, or even lasting reform,
but there is surely an exemplary answer to the charge that legal realism
really is nihilism.
Hurst's credo and, more unusually, also his meticulous work push us
outside the judicial framework. He wants us to concentrate on affirmative
efforts to use law to supply a better framework to resolve societal conflicts,
despite a long national history of drift. Legal institutions are not to be
found within the four corners of appellate decisions, which are primarily
the museums and galleries of the wealthy and well connected. He is able to
convey the mood and personality of individuals in the context of their
environments with unusual sympathy but without actually sketching in the
details of their faces.
Discussions of legal realists and the ideas of community and common-
wealth again fill the law reviews. Across 40 years, The Growth of American
Law speaks directly to some of our most important academic debates. Vir-
tually all of Hurst's work demonstrates the difficulties and limitations of
reform. Yet he remains entirely committed to the effort to gather facts to
help liberate us from past mistakes. More basically, Hurst believes with
quiet passion that law can be used to push back our limits somewhat, and
that such an effort is well worth a lifetime's dedication.

